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A NOTE ON SUBSIDIZING GIFTS
ABSTRACT
Altruisticallymotivated gifts involve a species of consumption externality.Donors obtain
analtruistic benefit from the effectoftheir gifts on donees' utility but do not take into account
that the benefit to donees is itself relevant to social welfare. The level of gift-giving thus will
be lower than is optimal. A subsidy can correct this problem, while compulsory transfers
(assuming the state lacks information about who is altruistic) and bargaining between donors and
donees cannot. The rationale for subsidizing gifts offered here does not depend on whether the
donee's activity is a public good (as with gifts for medical research) or whether the transfer tends







and NBERGift—giving ——notablytransfers within the family and
philanthropy ——isa significant economic phenomenon.'
Presumably, altruism is an important motivation for many gifts.2
This note compares the private and social benefits of
altruistically motivated gifts and shows that subsidizing such
gifts would increase social welfare.
Altruistically motivated gifts involve a species of
consumption externality.3 A.nindividualisticsocial welfare
function includes both the donor's utility ——whichdepends in
this instance on the donee's utility ——andthe donee's utility
in its own right. Thus, a gift, by increasing the donee's
utility, enhances social welfare both because of the indirect
effect on the donor's utility and the direct effect on the
donee's. The donor, however, takes into account only the
indirect effect. As a result, even a donor who weighs the
donee's utility equally with his own does not account for the
full effect of his gift on social welfare.
In the model analyzed in section 1, social welfare can be
raised with a subsidy. As explained in section 2, the rationale
for subsidizing gifts offered here does not depend on whether the
1Forexample, charitable giving in the U.S. has typically amounted to
between two and three percent of national income. Clotfelter (1985, table
1.2).
2Tobe sure, altruism hardly motivates all giving. See Andreoni (1988),
section 1.3, and note 13.
This point appears in Friedman (1988), who does not examine subsidies.
Becker's (1976) we1liaiown analysts also differs from that here, as he
considers privately optimal allocations and how they affect individuals'
incentives, but not what allocation would be socially optimal or how that
allocation might be induced. The idea that the presence of altruism does not
solve all problems to which it is applicable has received increasing
attention. See, for example, Bernheim and Stark (1988).donee's activity is a public good (as with gifts for medical
research) or whether the transfer tends to equalize the wealth of
donors and donees ——factorsemphasized in the existing
literature on the subject. Atkinson (1976) is closest to the
present inquiry. Although he addresses what tax treatment of
charitable contributions is optimal from the perspective of
redistribution, his formulation employs an explicit social
welfare function and considers donors' motivations for giving in
a similar manner.
The welfare consequences of gifts are of particular
importance in light of existing policies that subsidize some
forms of giving, as through tax exemptions and deductions. For
example, the revenue loss from the charitable contribution
deduction under the U.S. federal income tax in fiscal year 1994
is expected to be about twenty billion dollars. The revenue loss
from step—up basis of capital gains at death (bequests being an
important component of transfers to individuals) will be
approximately fifty billion dollars. Relatedly, federal taxes on
estates and gifts are estimated to exceed twelve billion dollars.
(Budget of the United States Government (1993).]
1. Analysis
1.1. Gifts in the Abeence of Subsidies
There are two types of individuals, donees ——eachof whose
utility is a concave function, V, of his own wealth ——anddonors
——eachof whose utility is the sum of a concave function, U, of
his own wealth and A times a respective donee's utility. (Each
donor is paired with a donee.) Donors' and donees' initial
—2—levels of wealth are w and y respectively. Each donor choosesa
gift, g[0,WI, to transfer to a donee, to maximize
(1) U(w—g) + AV(y+g).
The first—order condition for an interior solution is
(2) U' =ASP'.
-
Therewill be no gift if donors' level of altruism is
sufficiently small. For example, if U(.) =V(.)and w =y,g >a
if and only if A > 1.
Assuming for simplicity that social welfare is the sum of
utilities, the socially optimal g maximizes
(3)(U +Ày)+V—U(w—g)+(l+A)V(y+g).
The first-order condition for an interior solution is
(4) U' =(l+A)V'.
Using the previous example of equal initial wealth and identical
functions for utility of Wealth, a positive transfer is optimal
when A >0.Moreover, the optimal transfer exceeds that which
maximizes (1). The private and social optima differ because each
donor counts the respective donee's utility only f or its effect
on the donor's own utility (no matter how large is the A), while
social Welfare also includes the effect on the donee's utility in
its own right. This divergence is reflected in the difference
between the weights A and l+A in (1) and (3) or (2) and (4).
—3—1.2. optimal Subsidy
If the social authority knew which individuals were donors
and donees, the level of altruism, the initial levels of wealth,
and the functional f on for utility of individuals' own wealth,
it simply could order the appropriate transfers. More
realistically, much of this information will be unobservable (or
costly to observe).
Assume, for example, that the social authority does not know
who prospective donors and donees are, but that it does know A,
identical for all donors. When individuals begin with equal
wealth and have the same functions for utility of own wealth,
prospective donors will not give any gift when A <1;hence,
observing private behavior would be insufficient to reveal who
was altruistic. Thus, the optimal compulsory transfer scheme
involves no transfers, as there is no basis for determining who
should be ordered to transfer to whom.
With the same assumption about information, consider a
subsidy. Let s be the rate at which donors are subsidized, so
that a donor's private cost of giving a gift g becomes (1—s)g.
This subsidy is financed by a pro rata lump-sum tax that
individuals take as given.4 It can be demonstrate& that the
optimal subsidy rate is
The analysis to follow demonstrates implicitly that the effect of this tax
on donors and donees' wealth disappears in equilibrium; donors are induced to
distribute wealth between themselves and donees optimally, so that the
increase in donors' giving is sufficient to offset the tax paid by donees. If
the subsidy were financed by distortionary taxation, the optimal subsidy would
differ.
When the subsidy is l/(l+A), the gift costs a donor A/(l+A), Then, the
derivative of the donor's utility with respect to g is
—4—3. V1 (s=—=-—
l+A U'
When there is an interior solution ——thatis, when there is any
giving in the presence of this subsidy scheme --thesubsidy
induces the first—best allocation of wealth because it
internalizes the externality, which is V'1 measured in utility
units to the donor, U'.6
Note that when A is very small the subsidy rate approaches
100% of the amount of the transfer, but when A is very large
(much larger than 1) the subsidy is very small, approaching zero
in the limit. The intuition is that, without the subsidy, a
donor weights the donee's utility by only A rather than l+A; when
A is near zero, the relative gap between the private and social
valuations of V is very large, but when A is large, the relative
gap is small (even though the absolute gap is the sane, equal to
1 in both instances).
The subsidy in this simple model requires knowledge of A, but
is independent of wealth levels w and y and of utility functions
tJ() and V(.). Consider briefly the case in which the level of A
varies among potential donors and is not directly observable. In
this instance, the optimal mechanism may well involve a subsidy,
with the rate a function of the amount of individuals' gifts.
+AV',
which yields (4) as the first-order condition for the donor.
When the first-best allocation requires donees to give to donors -.asit
would if donees were sufficiently wealthier than donors -.asubsidy would
fail, resulting in the corner solution in which there is no giving. Also,
note that when A —0,a —1,implying that donors are indifferent about the
size of their gift; implicitly, the assumption in this case is that donors
give the socially optimal gift.
—5—Higher transfers would signal higher A's and thus ca1l for lower
subsidy rates. Of course, prospective donors would take this
into account and may be induced to transfer less than they would
if the subsidy rate were fixed. This is an instance of the
familiar revelation problem (see Myerson (1979)], and an
incentive—compatible mechanisM would not allow implementation of
the first—best. Also note that, when A is not observable, the
optimal scheme would depend upon initial wealth levels and
individuals' utility functions. For example, if a donor has
higher initial wealth, a lower A is implied by any level of
giving, ceteris paribus. As a result, individuals with similar
giving patterns would receive larger subsidies the greater their
observed wealth.
13. A More General Formulation with Wan-Glow Giving
An altruistic donor's utility might depend on the donee's
wealth or utility in more subtle ways. Moreover, gifts might
also be motivated by the .benef it to the donor from the act of
giving itself (wan glow), rather than purely by concern for the
well-being of the beneficiary (Andreoni (1990)). Instead of 11),
the donor would maximize TJ(w—g,y+g,g). In place of (5), the
condition for the optimal subsidy would be
2V'
(6) —,, +u1 + v'
where U is the derivative of U with respect to argument i.
Although not immediately apparent, expression (6) is essentially
the same as (5) for the simple case.7 In particular, the optimal
1Expression(5) could also have been written as
—6—subsidy is lower when altruism, here indicated by the magnitude
of U2, is greater. (The existence of a wan—glow motive does not
affect the formula for the optimal subsidy: the externality --
thatthe donor does not count V directly ——existsregardless of
the motive for giving.')
2. Remarks
(a) Why private agreement cannot internalize the gift
externality.Private agreement cannot produce a first—best
outcome,as with typical externalities.' The reason is that a
transferof wealth itself is thesourceof the effect on social
welfare.If a prospective donee offered a side payment, p, to a
prospective donor in an attempt to induce the socially optimal
gift, that payment would itself constitute undoing of the gift.
(A gift of g induced by a payment of p is identical in the model
to a gift of g—p and no side payment.)
The problem arises because achieving the social optimum
involves a redistribution of wealth. Although there is an
2V' —U'+Ày'+V''
The intuition for (6) -.andthis variation of (5) --isthat donors ignore
both the independent benefit of their gift to donees, V, and the cost of the
subsidy (the lump-sum tax is taken as given), which at the niargth equals s/2
(each pays half the subsidy cost) times the direct marginal utility of the
donor,U1, thedonee, V', plus of the indirect effect of the donee on the
donor,U2.When s isgiven by (6), external costs equal externalbenefits, so
donors' decisions are optimal.
The presence of a warm-glow motive will increase the level of ;ivinç for a
given degree of altruism, which may affect the optimal level of the subsidy
because the relevant marginal utilities are affected. In the simple case in
which altruism takes the form in the initial model, the optimal subsidy equals
l/(l+A) regardless of any wan-glow motive. As a result, if evidence
indicates that a given level of observed giving is more explained by the warm-
glow effect than altruism, the optimal subsidy rate would be higher because A
(reflected in (6) by 112) would be lower.
'SeeCoase (1960). Friedman (1988) has indicated that bargaining cannot
eliminate this externality.
—7—externality in the sense that donors do not fully appropriate the
benefit of their gifts, the private allocation (with no subsidy
or compulsory transfer) is a pareto optimum ——onediffering from
that which maximizes the sum of utilities. It is familiar that
individual decisionmaking will not maximize social welfare when
matters of distribution are involved.
(b) Other rationales for subsidizing gifts. A frequently
offered rationale for subsidy to charities also invokes the
concept of externalities. It relies on the assumption that
institutions receiving gifts use them in a way that creates
positive externalities, as with medical research." It is not
contemplated that, looking solely at the donor and donee (even if
the donee is not a "charity"), there is an externality of
sorts.1' Another common rationale for subsidy focuses on the
redistributive dimension of giving -—i.e.,the extent, if any,
to which gifts involve transfers from rich to poor. In contrast,
the discussion here emphasizes a rationale independent from both
the nature of the recipient's activities and traditional
redistribution, in that it holds even if the recipient spends the
'°Itis proposed that subsidies be used in an attempt to implement a Lindahi
solution. See Hochman and Rogers (1977).
"Forexample, Hochman and Rogers (1.917, p.3) state: "External benefits must accrue in the demands forthe specific services that charity finances
tojustifythepublic subsidization of charity. Otherwise, the benefits of
giving are private, and no subsidy is warranted.Thisviewpoint perhaps
explainswhy the literature focuses on gifts to public charities, ignoring
gifts to individuals, Of course1 income redistribution itself can be a public
good,justifying subsidy(or compulsory redistribution) on conventional
externality grounds. Hochman and Rogers (1969)explain that such
redistributionmay be warranted because of the effect a wealthy donor's gift
to a poor donee has on the utility of third parties (others whose utility
depends on the welfare of the poor). Their focus, as the title to their well-
known article suggests, ison the redistribution necessary to reacha pareto
optimum, not, as here,on inducing transfers that result in asocialwelfare
maximizingpareto optimum that differs from the private allocation, which is itselfpareto optimal.
—a—gift on ordinary consumption and initial wealth is equal (or the
donee is richer than the donor).
(c) Policy implications. The central conclusion derived here
is that the optimal subsidy rate for gifts is positive.12 Of
course, any rationale for subsidizing gifts assumes that,asa
practical matter, they can be distinguished from payments for
goodsor services.'3 But the presenceof return flows from
beneficiariesto donors (which could even include returning the
gift itself) would often be difficult to detect, particularly for
gIftswithin the family.
This administrative constraint may be more of a problem with
respect to private giving than contributions to public charities.
Indeed, gifts to charities are subsidized, by the income tax
deduction for charitable contributions and the exemption from
many forms of taxation for charitable activity.'4
Treatment of gifts to individuals is quite different.
Although the income tax excludes gifts from donees' income (which
some view as an implicit subsidy), donors get no deduction.
Whatever its merits, this approach is surely more administrable
12 Although the conclusion does not depend on the additive (utilitarian)
specification of the social welfare function, it does depend upon a welfarist
approach. The inclusion of the donor's altruistically derived utility may be
controversial. But satisfaction from altruism, even if deemed selfish
altruism,is arguably at leastas virtuous asordinary selfish pleasure.
Moreover,if this source of utility is excluded froth social welfare, the
optimal subsidy would equal 1-A, and thus would be negative -.atax-.when
A> 1.
13For evidence that much giving is motivated by exchange rather than
altruism, see Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) and Cox (1987).
14 Much of the literature on taxpolicyaddresses the extent to which various
tax policies encourage charitable giving, devoting little attention to how
much giving (and by whom)issocially optimal. For a discussion of empirical
work on charitable giving, see Clotfelter (1985).
—9—than alternatives, particularly in light of the difficulty of the
government in assessing whether private transfers are gifts or
expenditures forgoods and services. Nonetheless, large gifts
and bequestsare separately taxed, which is not consistent with
the efficiencyargument developed here.
Theefficiency rationale also has implications for the form
of an optimal subsidy; recall that the optimal subsidy rate is
higher for less altruistic donors because the weight they give to
donees is a relatively lower fraction of the socially appropriate
weight. This implies, first, that the optimal subsidy rate is
lower for larger gifts, to the extent they reflect greater
altruism rather than higher income of the donor. Yet reformers
often advocate that a floor be placed on the charitable
contribution deduction, limiting the subsidy to large gifts.
Second, the optimal subsidy is higher for gifts of a given size
made by high—income donors, because their higher income implies a
lower degree of altruism, ceteris paribus. As a result, a tax
deduction ——worthmore to those in higher tax brackets ——isnot
obviously inferior to a credit, which is often proposed as a
replacement for the current deduction.15 It should be
emphasized, however, that the efficiency property of a subsidy
for giving is only one factor relevant to how a subsidy scheme or
a tax system should treat gifts.
15Thepresent analysis, like that in Atkinson (1976), differs from that of
many reformers, such as Vickrey (1947, 1975), because results are derived from
an explicit welfare function, as urged by Stiglitz and Boskin (1977), rather
than troa a stipulated reference point, such as a comprehensive definition of
income.
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